Pakistan, Regional Security and Conflict Resolution: The Pashtun ‘Tribal’ Areas
By Farooq Yousaf (Copyright Year 2021)
This book shows how colonial legacies and the postcolonial state of Pakistan negatively influenced the socio-political and cultural dynamics and the security situation in Pakistan’s Pashtun ‘tribal’ areas, formerly known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).
It discusses the history and background of the former-FATA region, the role of Pashtun conflict resolution mechanism of Jirga, and the persistence of colonial-era Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) in the region. The author argues that the persistence of colonial legacies in the Pashtun ‘tribal’ areas, especially the FCR, coupled with the overarching influence of the military on security policy has negatively impacted the security situation in the region. By focusing on the Jirga and Jirga-based Lashkars (or Pashtun militias), the book shows how Pashtuns have engaged in their own initiatives to handle the rise of militancy in their region. Moreover, the book argues that, even after the introduction of constitutional reforms and FATA’s merger with the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, little has changed in the region, especially regarding the treatment of ‘tribal’ Pashtuns as equal citizens of Pakistan.
Historically and contextually informed with a focus on North-West Pakistan, this book will be of interest to academics studying South Asian Studies, peacebuilding, terrorism, and traditional justice and restorative forms of peace-making.
The tribal areas of Pakistan have played a critical role in the security of the country since Partition, particularly since the Taliban was ousted from power in 2001. Dr Farooq Yousaf’s book illustrates while militant activity has diminished in recent times, the law-and-order situation in the tribal areas remains precarious.
For a region that has been at the centre of many of the security issues on the western border of Pakistan since Partition in 1947, the tribal areas, formerly known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), has surprisingly received little attention in academic circles. Dr Farooq Yousaf’s recently published book, which is based on his recently completed doctoral thesis, fills this lacuna very well indeed.
This easy-to-read, well-structured book discusses a very sensitive issue. It details the story of FATA in Pakistan’s history, focussing especially on the last 20 years after the Taliban and its fellow ideological travellers were chased out of Kabul and fled across the border into Pakistan to find refuge in the tribal areas along the border with Afghanistan. This is also a timely book given the recent peace deal that was signed between the US and the Taliban, which is meant to be the first step towards a political solution in Afghanistan. If and when it happens, peace in Afghanistan would have significant positive consequences for the people of the tribal areas in Pakistan, given Pakistan has played an important role in getting the US and the Taliban to the negotiation table. But, sadly, we’re not quite there yet.
Former FATA, which is about a third the size of Tasmania with a population of about 5 million “tribal” Pashtuns, has never been fully integrated politically and economically with the rest of the country. Even with the constitutional amendment in May 2018 which abolished FATA and integrated it formally into the neighbouring province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, previously called North West Frontier Province, the tribal areas remain apart from mainstream Pakistan. FATA’s unique administrative set-up, which the Pakistan government kept for 71 years, was a legacy of British India when the colonial rulers were unable to subdue the tribesmen.
Yousaf argues—I believe correctly, that like the British, the Pakistan authorities have not only looked at the Pashtun tribesmen as “savages” but also as not trustworthy. The lack of enthusiasm to join Pakistan at Partition certainly fuelled the lack of trust towards the Pashtuns, as did the Afghanistan-supported movement for a “Pashtunistan”—an independent state for Pashtuns which would conveniently not include the Pashtuns of Afghanistan. Because of this “separateness” from the rest of Pakistan, FATA was neglected by successive central governments and as a result that area is today the most economically backward part of Pakistan, with 60 per cent of the population living below the poverty level and every socio-economic development indicator shockingly low. This is one of the few weaknesses of the book: the lack of in-depth analysis of these socio-economic indicators and what effect it had on the growth of militancy in the tribal areas.
Compounding the poor economic development of the former FATA was the implementation of the Frontiers Crimes Regulation (FCR) until 2018. This was administered by an-all powerful Political Agent (PA), who surveyed the seven different agencies which make up FATA. (A map of the tribal areas would have been very useful so as to get a sense of the distances and geography.) The FCR was a colonial legacy which, Yousaf argues, Pakistan authorities ruthlessly used to control the region, including imposing collective punishment on whole villages or tribes if the PA’s orders were not followed.
It is in this economically and politically neglected environment, and geographically remote and rugged terrain, that the Taliban and other like-minded groups found refuge after being ousted from power by the US-led coalition in 2001. These militant groups—Afghan and home-grown—imposed their repressive Jihadist ideology and assassinated thousands of tribal elders who opposed their world outlook. The locals sought help from the Pakistan military in removing these terrorists and re-establish peace in their neighbourhood.
As Yousaf discusses in quite some detail, Islamabad took a dual track approach. The military entered into some 30 peace deals with some of the militants—the so-called “good” Taliban who were mainly anti-Coalition forces—and conducted military operations against the “bad” Taliban who were anti-Pakistan. Both approaches had mixed results, at best.
The militants quickly ripped up many of the peace agreements, thus strengthening their position via-à-vis the tribal elders. As for the military operations, conducted over more than 15 years and involving several hundred thousand troops, these caused massive destruction of property and forced almost two million people to flee their homes and find refuge elsewhere. The Pakistan military, which had been geared, organised, and trained for traditional warfare with India, was not ready, at least initially, for asymmetrical warfare in the mountainous terrain of former FATA. And although the Pakistan military lost more men fighting in the tribal areas then the combined losses of the Coalition forces in Afghanistan, the military used a heavy-handed and non-discriminatory approach in hunting down the militants, causing great suffering among the civilian population. Compounding an already dire situation is the Pakistan government’s failure to subsequently deliver on the funding they promised for development and the rebuilding of the widespread destruction of infrastructure.
Sadly, the big losers in the fight against the militants have been the tribal elders. Either they were physically eliminated by the Taliban or were sidelined by the military. As Yousaf argues, the weakening of the authority of the elders will have a direct impact on the jirga, the traditional tribal decision-making bodies run by the elders, and their ability to raise lashkars, Pashtun tribal militias, to carry out decisions arrived at within jirga. This is not good for insuring peace and security in the tribal areas in the future.
One of the consequences of the developments in the tribal areas has been the rapid rise of the Pashtun Tahafuz (Protection) Movement (PTM). Yousaf argues that it is the “overarching influence of the military on security policy” in former FATA, the lack of “basic human rights for Pashtuns” and mainstream political parties’ failure to take up the cause of the Pashtuns which has fuelled the growth of the PTM. Whether the PTM will be able to—or even allowed to—develop as a political party remains to be seen.
Dr Claude Rakisits is an Honorary Associate Professor in the Department of International Relations at the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs at the Australian National University. He tweets @ClaudeRakisits. His publications can be assessed on his website.
COVID-19 lockdowns throughout the world have aggravated socio-political inequalities, especially in the Global South as governments try to respond to the pandemic. Various terrorist, radical and violent extremist groups, especially the so-called Islamic State, are trying to cash in on these inequalities to propagate hate-filled narratives.
In Nigeria, for instance, Boko Haram has called the closure of mosques — a precaution taken in response to COVID-19 — a direct ‘attack on Islam’. Similarly, there remains fear among security experts that as the lockdowns continue to confine people to their homes, radical and violent extremist groups are gaining an opportunity to radicalise ‘younger’ audiences who are spending more unsupervised time on the Internet.
The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation’s (ASIO) Deputy Director-General Heather Cook, speaking at the Australian Parliament’s Joint Intelligence and Security Committee, also warned that the conditions arising out of the pandemic have provided extremist groups, including neo-Nazi organisations, the means to radicalise more people.
In a recent meeting of the UN Security Council on pressing global security issues in August, counter-terrorism experts noted a spike in the so-called Islamic State’s (IS) online activities. Experts also reiterated the importance of repatriating terrorist families stranded in the Middle East to prevent IS from spreading its influence. These concerns indicate that the threat from violent extremist and terrorist groups such as IS remains within both ‘virtual’ (online) and ‘physical’ (family) networks.
In recent months, IS’s online propaganda campaign — unlike its coherent media campaigns during the group’s peak before 2017 — has mushroomed, with supporters all over the world running individual campaigns. According to Michael Krona, much of the IS literature is now propagated by IS supporters through bots on Telegram and other social media platforms. Moreover, in order to avoid detection by law enforcement agencies, IS and its supporters have increased their online activity in recent months through the constant renewal of online hyperlinks and the migration to and from different platforms.
Security agencies in South Asia have also witnessed a spike in IS’s online activity intended to radicalise a younger audience. India’s National Investigation Agency (NIA) reported a rise in online activity from IS supporters, especially in the southern states of Kerala, Telangana, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu, where 122 accused have so far been arrested. Bangladesh similarly reported a surge in online IS propaganda activities mainly targeting urban, educated youths.
Family terror networks remain a prominent feature of IS’s global operations. These networks, even today, present a major global security threat mostly because of legal, social and privacy concerns that make it challenging to monitor family units and their activities extensively. Several high-profile terrorist attacks under the banner of IS, in recent times, have involved marriage and relatives. In one instance on 24 August, ‘widows’ of two prominent IS militants carried out twin suicide bombings in Jolo town in the Philippines, killing 15. Similarly, this October, security agencies in the Philippines arrested another woman planning a suicide attack in the country. Rezky Fantasya Rullie is believed to be the wife of a militant killed in Sulu in August and possibly the daughter of two suicide bombers who conducted an attack on a Catholic cathedral in Jolo in 2019.
That members of the same family unit are involved in radicalisation activities and terrorist attacks warrants attention from security strategists and policymakers. With lockdowns in place in most of the world and IS supporters increasing their online presence, the probability that traditional conservative families will be targeted by IS for radicalisation is higher. In such families, older male members are generally revered, making it easier to persuade both younger and female members into joining extremist political, religious and violent groups.
There is now a specific focus among extremist groups on recruiting female operatives, especially in Bangladesh, suggesting these groups are increasingly turning to women to radicalise other members of the family. Other groups in South Asia such as Lashkar-e-Taiba — the Pakistani militant group accused of engaging in proxy-warfare in Indian Kashmir — have effectively targeted and used females to convince their sons to wage jihad against India.
The twin threats of virtual and physical recruitment present short and long-term implications for states in the Global South that lack the infrastructure and capabilities to combat radicalisation and terrorism. Although technological advancements enable the monitoring of terrorists on online networks, monitoring and countering physical family networks still presents significant policy challenges.
As witnessed in the well-coordinated 2019 Easter attacks in Sri Lanka — involving members of two families — even though the operational capacity of IS has taken a significant hit in the Middle East, the threat of online and family terror networks, especially in South Asia, cannot be underestimated.
Farooq Yousaf holds a PhD in politics from the University of Newcastle, Australia.
Disclaimer: This is not a paid review or promotion. These are personal experiences and views on a product that helped me regain some of my lost sleep. These observations are based on my own specific personal circumstances. I am not an expert on sleep issues, therefore, I am not generalizing the benefits of this products nor claiming that this product will help everyone.
Coming from an academic, research and journalism background, this review is not something I would usually write. Many of my friends, colleagues and peers might even be surprised and enquire as to what prompted me to write this review for something that has nothing to do with my profession.
However, I have a simple answer; an excellent product, with an amazing after-sales service, which helped me regain some of my lost sleep.
Being an early career researcher has its ups and downs. One of the biggest ‘downs’ in that regard is uneven sleeping hours, mainly due to the random patterns of our research, reading and writing. Even though I succeeded in completing my PhD thesis on time, it was last year (after finishing my PhD) that I realized the massive negative impact my research had on my sleep. Even with little stress and work pressures, I was sleeping late and waking up early in the morning. A lack of sleep ultimately had a negative impact on my mental health, making me more agitated and less calm.
It was then that I started looking into products that could help me sleep better. Ultimately, I landed on the Bose Sleepbuds (Version 1).
Initially, I was unwilling to spend over $300 AUD on a product that looked like just ‘another’ pair of earbuds, with some pre-set sounds and tunes. However, I decided to give it a shot. Initially, I was unable to get used to sleeping with the earbuds. However, after a couple of weeks, I did not only get used to the product, but it also started improving, and increasing, my sleeping hours without waking up in the middle of the night. The Sleepbuds also helped me get 8 hours of uninterrupted sleep, which also had a positive impact on my overall day to day functioning.
As fate would have it, after few months of use, I started noticing major issues with the battery. The battery was only charging up to 57% (for some reason), and draining in less than four hours, compared to the eight hours promised by Bose. I still persisted with the product as, due to my previous experiences with other brands, I did not believe that I will get a product replacement after almost a year of use. In the meantime, I also landed on a news story stating that Bose had recalled the whole batch of its Sleepbuds due to battery issues and it was also offering replacements and refunds. However, I had missed the deadline for a refund.
Ironically, I still persisted with the product until one of the magnets (that holds the earbuds in the charging station) lost it magnetic power, making it impossible for me to recharge one of the buds. In the meantime, I had also backed a similar product on a crowdfunding platform, hoping that the product might be good replacement for my Bose buds. Once the product arrived, I realized why Bose buds’ cost what they cost and why the new buds were nowhere near Bose in terms of quality, battery time, and the length (and loops) of sounds and tunes. The sound loops for many might not be a major deal. However, longer sound loops ensure that you get less distractions and disruptions while listening to your sounds before sleeping.
Finally, I decided to contact Bose customer service, hoping to get some resolution for my product, and encountered my first pleasant surprise. Due to my introverted nature, I avoid “calling” customer service helplines. Therefore, I was really glad that Bose had a WhatsApp chat service. The customer service officer, responding on WhatsApp, chat was not only courteous and helpful, but they also resolved my issue within a few hours. It was also then I encountered my second shock. Bose offered to replace my Version 1 with Version 2 (released recently), free of cost. I couldn’t believe this offer until I physically had my hands on the replacement, and the product arrived within two weeks.
With the new product, I noticed a number of major upgrades.
First, the earbuds had a better design and fit better in the ears.
Second, the battery charging was better and faster with a USB-C port. Even though Bose claims that the battery lasts between 8-10 hours (compared to Version 1’s maximum 8 hours), I have had 30% battery left even after 10 hours of usage. This means that Bose has remained on the cautious side in terms of its battery claims, which is understandable as Version 1 mainly failed due to battery issues. The battery lasts longer than 10 hours, which is an amazing upgrade.
Third, unlike a limited number of pre-set sounds and tunes on Version 1, Version 2 has three times more the sounds and tunes. This allows the user to choose between different sounds and tunes, and ultimately selecting the one that suits them the best.
Fourth, the new buds have a separate magnet in them for better alignment with the charging case. The buds now automatically fit (and stick) on the charging case, with a stronger magnet, without having to look for the ‘magnet’ in the case. A separate magnet in the earbuds might look like a trivial thing, however, the magnet ensures that the buds are placed perfectly in the charging case, even in dark, without much effort.
Finally, where previously transferring a new tune or sound took hours, Version 2 takes 10-15 minutes to transfer a new tune to your earbuds.
In short, so far, I have been really satisfied with Bose Sleepbuds II. The price tag might seem a bit high to young researchers, academics and students. However, from personal experience, I can definitely and safely say that it is worth the investment. Having said that, I still think that like other major services and products on the market, Bose can look into offering the product at a discounted price to students and young academics, to attract a segment of customers that will definitely gain benefits from this product.
As I mentioned in the disclaimer above, I am not a sleep expert, and not claiming that the product will help everyone with sleep issues. However, the product helped me regain some of my lost sleep. Therefore, for researchers with similar issues, it might be worth giving this product a shot; even if it is a free trial 90-day offered by Bose.
Following its territorial losses in Iraq and Syria and in the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic, which has led to tighter territorial, border and air controls, the Islamic State may seek to use unconventional methods for its radicalisation and recruitment drives. Two such methods are stepping up its online presence and propaganda and exploiting family ties to expand its networks.
In a 24 August 2020 meeting of the UN Security Council on pressing global security issues, counterterrorism experts reiterated the importance of repatriating terrorist families to prevent IS spreading its influence across countries and regions. The meeting also noted a spike in IS’s online activities targeting people confined to their homes amid Covid-19 lockdowns. For example, the June 2020 ‘lockdown’ edition of The Voice of Hind, an English-language online magazine published by IS supporters in India, even encouraged IS supporters to use children to spread coronavirus among disbelievers.
Family terror networks have been a prominent feature in IS’s global operations. Those networks present major global security threats largely because of legal, social and privacy concerns that make it challenging to monitor the activities of family units. Several high-profile terrorist attacks under the banner of IS in recent times have involved people related by marriage and by blood. In one such instance, on 24 August 2020, the ‘widows’ of two prominent IS militants carried out twin suicide bombings in Jolo in the Philippines, killing 15 people.
In 2018, Australia suffered a terrorist attack that was a consequence of the radicalisation of two Bangladeshi sisters by IS. On 9 February, while studying in Melbourne, Momena Shoma stabbed her homestay host in her quest to ‘become a martyr’. Shoma was initially radicalised online when she started following hardline preachers like Anwar al-Awlaki and watching IS videos. Two days after the attack, when security agencies raided Shoma’s house in Bangladesh in further investigations, her sister, Asmal Husna, attacked the security officials in another IS-inspired attack.
The sisters’ case also suggests that IS is increasingly looking to attract and recruit female operatives in ‘active’ roles, especially in South Asia. By attracting women into its fold, the group seeks to promote itself as a global enterprise for both men and women, unlike other terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda, which, even though they have some female operatives, mainly recruit men. By 2019, 16% of foreign terrorist fighters in IS were women.
The underlying factors leading to the involvement of members of the same family or the whole family unit in radicalisation and terrorist attacks warrant attention from security strategists and policymakers. With Covid-19 lockdowns in place in many countries and IS increasing its online presence, the probability of traditional conservative families, confined to their homes, being targeted for radicalisation becomes higher. In such families, male members (fathers, husbands and brothers) are treated with respect, making it easier for them to persuade both younger and female members to join violent political or religious groups.
Although technological advances have enabled the monitoring of terrorists in online networks, monitoring and countering physical family networks present significant policy challenges. There are also gaps in security infrastructure, especially in the global south, for understanding and dealing with the role of kinship and family ties in terrorist recruitment and radicalisation. As is evidenced by the well-coordinated 2019 Easter attacks in Sri Lanka involving members of an affluent family, even though IS’s operational capacity has taken a major hit in the Middle East, the threat of family terror networks there and elsewhere shouldn’t be underestimated.
It’s still too early to gauge the real impact of IS’s exploitation of ‘family’ terrorism using comprehensive online recruitment strategies in the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic. However, it is timely to start a discussion on the importance, and vulnerability, of kin and family networks in contemporary radicalisation and terrorist recruitment. To prevent and counter this threat, a good starting point could be a focus on the family unit as an essential determinant of radicalisation and recruitment. For experts in preventing and countering violent extremism and for policymakers, traditional family structures can be vital tools in deradicalisation. This is because disapproving relatives, respected within the family, can help dissuade family members from joining radical and violent groups.AUTHOR
Synopsis: Since territorial and organisational setbacks in Iraq and Syria, coupled with improvements in financial and border controls, the Islamic State (IS) terrorist group is employing unconventional strategies to attract recruits, such as the use of kinship and family networks. This paper discusses the potential of kinship and family ties in IS’ terror recruitment in South Asia. This study underscores that kin terrorism remains understudied in South Asia and requires systematic investigation for a better understanding in relation to terrorist recruitment. The paper concludes with the recommendation that future CT and PCVE strategies in South Asia should factor in kin terrorism and the role of familial networks in recruitment and radicalisation to effectively counter the twin threats of extremism and terrorism.
In what came as a major shock to the global community, American President Donald Trump, earlier this week, announced that he is suspending American funding to the World Health Organisation (WHO). The United States (US) president was critical of the WHO’s handling of the coronavirus pandemic, arguing that the body “failed in its basic duty”, relied too much on the Chinese government’s information and, therefore, should be held accountable. During a media briefing on April 14th, Trump announced,
“Today I’m instructing my administration to halt funding of the World Health Organization while a review is conducted to assess [its] role in severely mismanaging and covering up the spread of the coronavirus.”
His critics have since argued that Trump has simply used this decision as a diversion tactic, fending off criticism aimed at his administration for not only mishandling the pandemic but also not taking it seriously. Moreover, philanthropists like Melinda Gates have warned that suspending the funding is “as dangerous as it sounds” as the world needs the “WHO now more than ever”.
Even though the WHO has refrained from directly criticising the decision and President Trump, the body’s Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus has warned that the politicisation of the coronavirus pandemic can lead to many more deaths. He stated,
“If you want to be exploited and if you want to have many more body bags, then you do it. If you don’t want many more body bags, then you refrain from politicizing it.”
The WHO was formed in 1948 and was mandated to assist its member states with primary healthcare along with a supervision of global public health issues and emergencies. The WHO is made functional and operational through voluntary contributions from its member states. However, as seen in the chart below, the US is, by far, the biggest contributor to the WHO. Therefore, President Trump’s decision to suspend the funding can have far-reaching consequences in the fight against the coronavirus outbreak.
It is also worth noting that even though the Trump administration is now pinning nearly all the blame on China, the US president was all praise for the Chinese government in January for its tackling of the Covid-19 pandemic. On January 25th, Trump tweeted,
“China has been working very hard to contain the Coronavirus. The United States greatly appreciates their efforts and transparency. It will all work out well. In particular, on behalf of the American People, I want to thank President Xi!”
However, keeping aside Trump’s decision, a lot of questions have also been raised about how the WHO initially handled the situation. The body is accused of not taking the threat of Covid-19’s human-to-human transmission seriously in January.
On December 31, 2019, after gaining knowledge of the first coronavirus cases, the Chinese government informed the WHO of a pneumonia-like case in Wuhan. Then on January 14, 2020, the WHO shared initial Chinese investigations on the virus, stating that there was no evidence of human-to-human transmission of the virus. It was on January 22nd, following a brief visit to China, that the WHO stated human-to-human transmission of the coronavirus was happening in China. However, the WHO also took the position of praising China for its response and commitment to transparency in handling the outbreak.
Therefore, even though Trump did mainly use the WHO to divert blame for the shortcomings in his own leadership, his critique of the global health body still carries some weight.
Since the beginning of the pandemic, and following Trump’s WHO announcement and back to back accusations against China, many have now pointed out the visible and growing cracks in global, especially Western, cooperation to deal with this crisis.
Back in 2014, the US effectively responded to the Ebola outbreak by sending in medical supplies and troops to West Africa. However, this time around, the US is virtually absent from the global debate on the outbreak’s unified response. Nathalie Tocci, the director of the Italian Institute for International Affairs and a former European Union (EU) policy adviser, summarises the US absence in the following words,
“To me what is so striking is the complete absence of the US from public debates. The US is basically off the map, and China very much is on the map.”
Moreover, by calling it a “Chinese virus”, the Trump administration has already made its intentions clear of not wanting to cooperate with China on the pandemic’s global response. Secondly, the “idea” of the European Union has also come under question as Italy, amid its coronavirus crisis, felt it was abandoned by the EU member states. The EU Commission president Ursula von der Leyen issued an apology to Italy, on behalf of the EU, saying,
“Too many were not there on time when Italy needed a helping hand. And yes, for that, it is right that Europe as a whole offers a heartfelt apology.”
On the other hand, after announcing a state of emergency in March, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic issued a call for help from China, stating that “the only country that can help us is China”.
In short, the coronavirus pandemic has effectively led the global community on a path towards a reset; this includes a reset of the global economy, healthcare facilities, bilateral and multilateral ties, and climate change policies. However, even with these developments, it is too early to predict whether the US will lose its status of a ‘global power’.
As the global community is still finding ways to contain the deadly spread of coronavirus (COVID-19), both Australia and New Zealand are effectively working towards “flattening the curve” of daily new cases of COVID-19 infections. These two countries present concise case studies of effective tackling of the deadly pandemic not only for Pakistan but also for the rest of the world.
As of April 10, 2020, the total number of COVID-19 cases in Australia, New Zealand and Pakistan stand at 6152, 1015, and 4601 respectively. Even though the number of cases in both Australia and New Zealand is still on the lower side, compared to other “western” states, their response has been somewhat swift, systematic and aggressive.
Australia has enforced strict measures for both its citizens and residents as well as international visitors and visa holders. On March 19, Australian PM Scott Morrison, without any prior warning, announced to close the country’s borders to all “non-citizens”. This meant that other than Australian citizens, permanent residents and those on special status visas, no one was allowed to enter the country after the PM’s announcement.
Moreover, the country also imposed a strict quarantine policy for all citizens and permanent residents arriving in Australia. The Department of Home Affairs, in that regard, says that:
All travellers arriving in Australia must undertake a mandatory 14-day quarantine at designated facilities (for example, a hotel), in their port of arrival.
For international citizens in Australia, the government suggests:
Due to the current situation in Australia due to COVID-19, including state and territory border restrictions, business closures and social distancing requirements, all international visitors are encouraged to depart if it is possible to do so.
Similarly, New Zealand, which is one of few countries to have effectively contained the spread of COVID-19 in recent days, has also implemented an “Alert Level 4 – Eliminate” for the pandemic. Level 4 Alert implies that “it is likely that the disease is not contained”. According to Michael Baker and Nick Wilson, writing for The Guardian, this “elimination approach” by New Zealand is different from the “mitigation” approach of managing the “pandemic influenza”. According to them:
With mitigation, the response is increased as the pandemic progresses, and more intensive interventions such as school closures are often held in reserve to “flatten the peak”. By contrast, disease elimination partly reverses the sequence by using vigorous interventions early to interrupt disease transmission.
It is due to this aggressive approach that the number of daily new cases in both Australia and New Zealand is steadily falling as can be seen in Fig 1 below.
A major take away from both Australia and New Zealand is the fact that both the countries were able to implement an early lock-down; not only enforcing social distancing measures but also recommending that all non-essential workers work from home. Moreover, both countries also shut down their borders for international travel. By doing that, both the countries effectively controlled the transmission chain of the virus; buying essential time to implement their virus-elimination measures.
When it comes to testing, we find that both Australia and New Zealand boast a higher number of “tests per 1000 people” when compared to Pakistan.
In terms of the total number of tests, Australia has so far conducted 338,000 tests, New Zealand 59,000 and Pakistan 58,000 COVID-19 tests (see above, Fig 3). Therefore, where Australia and New Zealand’s “tests per 1000 people” stand at 13.2 and 12.1 respectively, Pakistan, on the other hand, has conducted a paltry 0.28 tests per 1000 people (see below, Fig 4).
Having discussed these measures, it is also worth noting that not all countries enjoy the luxury of pursuing the “elimination strategy”. Such a strategy can only work for countries that can effectively seal their borders and can bear the immense costs of testing and healthcare support. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the European continent and the US followed the “mitigation” strategy, which not only overburdened the healthcare system but also resulted in high infection and fatality rates.
However, even with such complications, a major lesson for Pakistan that needs to be learnt from both Australia and New Zealand is following a clear and concise policy. Both these countries, from the early rise in number of infections, were clear in their approach and policy actions. Even though Pakistan might not enjoy these favorable conditions – such as easy to manage borders and a stable economy – it can still ensure that its “mitigation strategy” for containing the coronavirus pandemic is clear and well laid-out. Only a clear policy and its implementation can, therefore, pull Pakistan out of this global health catastrophe that has claimed thousands of lives.
Choosing the Best Cities for Middle Eastern Eateries in Australia: An exploratory analysis of Sydney, Melbourne, Canberra, Brisbane and Perth
In this capstone project, I used my overall learning from IBM’s Professional Data Science Certificate to solve a problem that I often encountered while living in Australia. Moreover, it is also a common issue faced by many local and foreign tourists who travel to major metropolitans in Australia, however, they are overwhelmed by food choices. Hence, I will use this project to “explore” which major metropolitans in Australia are the best options for visiting restaurants and eateries offering “Middle Eastern” cuisine.
The cities that I analyzed included Sydney, Melbourne, Canberra, Perth and Brisbane. Even though Sydney is the densest city by population (ABS, 2020), and normally it would be assumed that it would be easier and more convenient to visit various venues in the city, however, from my personal experience, it takes longer to explore venues in Sydney than in Melbourne or Perth. Hence, this project tried to explore why is that the case, especially when Sydney has more venues than any other city in Australia.
The data required for this project was mainly of Middle Eastern restaurants based in the major cities of Australia; namely Sydney, Melbourne, Perth, Brisbane, and Canberra. For that purpose, I used the Foursquare API to extract data of Middle Eastern restaurants in the cities under discussion. The major values from that data that were required for this project were the name, address, latitude and longitude. Moreover, for analysis purposes, Wikipedia and the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS)data was also used to expand the analysis. To analyze the data and create data frames, pandas, NumPy and folium (for maps) libraries were used.
As John Rollins rightly argues, “lack sufficient understanding of how to go about solving problems using data science techniques” results in failure of adequately addressing the problem at hand (Rollins, 2015). Hence, in section 1 and 2 of this report, we started with introducing the problem, location and our data sources. In that regard, we used simple exploratory data analysis and map visualizations to find out which major cities in Australia are the best for local and foreign tourists in terms of eating at Middle Eastern restaurants.
Data Preparation and Modelling
We used the Foursquare API to search for Middle Eastern venues in our sample set of cities using the following code:
As our data was in a highly nested JSON format, we turned it into a Pandas Dataframe using json_normalize. After normalizing the data, we had the data in our required format of “Name”, “Address”, “Lat” and “Lng”.
Once we have normalized our data, we used a two-step approach to analyze our data. In the first step, we plotted the data normally as clusters of different venues in our sample cities. In our second step, we calculated the geographical centres of the city and the calculated the mean distance of venues from that centre. The analysis, even though not directly in our scope, also showed us how Middle Eastern restaurants are clustered in each of the five cities, indicating the diversity of the cities.
Results with normal plotting
While plotting our data for various cities, we first normally plotted the venues gathered from Foursquare API, along with calculating the central locations of all the cities. However, as we do not need to calculate the distance of venues from the centre, we first normally plotted the data.
Results with mean distance from the mean (center) location of the city:
Now that we have seen the clusters plotted on the map, we calculate the mean distance (average distance) of venues from the geographical centre of the city. The plot gives us a clearer picture of the true distance for a tourist or a traveller to visit various venues.
Values of Mean Distance (from mean center) of each city
Even though the mean square distance value gave us a clear picture, we calculated the mean square distance by excluding the maximum value of the “outliers”, to get a homogenous value. For this purpose, we use the NumPy mean function. We use the following code for each city:
Sydney, NSW: 0.11287612594187721
Canberra, ACT: 0.07047281616415198
Melbourne, VIC: 0.03318223070418223
Perth, WA: 0.04176312230297355
Brisbane, QLD: 0.05986191980294174
Discussion and Conclusion:
The findings from our analysis present an elaborate picture. As seen from our findings, when the venues were plotted without the mean square distance, the map, for a layman, might have shown that both Melbourne and Sydney might seem like good clusters with higher density. However, our mean square distance shows that even though Melbourne is indeed good, Sydney does not present a convenient picture as the mean square distance for Sydney is the highest compared to all other cities. This is because Sydney has a total area of 12,368 km², whereas other cities have the following areas: Brisbane 15,826 km², Melbourne 9,990 km², Perth 6,418 km², and Canberra 814.2 km² (Wikipedia, 2020). However, even though Brisbane, area-wise, is the largest “proper” city in Australia, it has a lower population than Sydney and Melbourne. Hence, this also suggests why Brisbane has fewer venues than Sydney and Melbourne because the latter cities have a higher population than Brisbane. Hence, our findings suggest that the best location for any tourist to try Middle Eastern food in Melbourne, as they will have to travel less to explore different venues in the city. After Melbourne, the two best options, in terms of less travel, are Perth and Canberra. The reason both Sydney and Brisbane, even being major metropolitans in Australia, have a higher mean square distance in terms of locations is that both the cities are area wise the biggest cities in Australia.
The project initially started with defining the problem statement, which questioned which major cities in Australia were the best for local and foreign tourists to visit Middle Eastern restaurants. Initially, from the normal clusters, it would seem that Melbourne and Sydney were indeed the best locations to visit the Middle Eastern venues. However, the mean square distance suggested that Sydney, with a larger area, had a higher mean square distance between the geographic centre of the city and all the venues. Similarly, Melbourne was the best city in this regard as the mean square distance was the lowest, suggesting that tourists would have to travel less to explore different venues. This project also explained how data science can solve even the simplest of problems in a more attractive manner.
The full repository for the project can be found here
The confusion surrounding the PTI Government in terms of dealing with the Coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak is also denting the party’s, especially PM Imran Khan’s, perception on social media. The three major stakeholders currently under discussion on the social media in terms of COVID-19 outbreak include the Sindh Government, the PTI Government and, more recently, DG ISPR.
Even though it should not be taken as a major generalizable indicator, a basic sentiment analysis conducted on these three stakeholders suggests that both the Sindh Government, and its CM Murad Ali Shah, and DGISPR, after his latest press talk on the coronavirus outbreak, are leading Pakistani twitter with twitter users expressing “positive sentiments” towards both of them. Even though sentiments towards PM Imran Khan are also predominantly positive, his ratio/percentage of positive to negative is lower than both CM Sindh and DG ISPR.
In the vast field of data science, sentiment analysis is a technique used in text mining and analysis of various emotions associated with the text. More specifically, it can refer to a “text mining technique for analyzing the underlying sentiment of a text message, i.e., a tweet. Twitter sentiment or opinion expressed through it may be positive, negative or neutral”. I have used a variety of text analysis libraries to run and re-run sentiment analyses of various datasets that I imported from twitter using Twitter’s API in Python.
Due to Twitter’s data extraction limitations, one can only extract a certain number of tweets at a given time. Hence, the following sentiment analyses are based on 500-1000 tweets for each of the three stakeholders. This analysis was performed to gauge the general sentiment of Pakistani Twitter in terms of how it was reacting to various major stakeholders in the country. Moreover, this analysis should be treated as a sample to explore wider applications of Machine Learning and Natural Language processing in political narrative and discourse analysis of Pakistan.
The following analyses of tweets do not contain retweeted tweets. The scale for reading the values of sentiment can be found at the bottom of this page*.
(Anyone interested in performing a Sentiment Analysis on their own can read this resource.)
The COVID-19 pandemic has somewhat brought the Pakistan Peoples Party back in the country’s mainstream politics. According to his supporters and critics alike, CM Murad Ali Shah of Sindh Province has led from the front to tackle the outbreak in the province. It is no wonder that over 80% of the tweets from our random sample of tweets expressed positive sentiments towards the Sindh CM.
Twitter Sentiment on DG ISPR
On the other hand, the newly appointed DG ISPR Maj Gen Babar Iftikhar has received positive feedback on his ‘apolitical’ press talk on Pakistan Resolution Day and the coronavirus pandemic. The DG argued that even though the ‘geographical’ borders had been closed as a preventive measure, “the actual border was between the man and the coronavirus, which we (Pakistan) have yet to take control of”. The tweets mentioning #DGISPR as their hashtag had an 80% positive sentiment ratio.
Twitter Sentiment on PM Imran Khan and PTI
Finally, both PM Imran Khan and his PTI Government had the lowest “positive sentiment” ratio out of the three stakeholders under discussion, with 67% positive tweets mentioning either #ImranKhan and #PTIGovernment. Even though the majority of the tweets in the sample had a positive sentiment, the lowest percentage of the three means that PM, due to lack of clarity in his plan for dealing with the outbreak, might have taken a hit on his popularity on twitter. This is especially interesting because PTI’s social media team and campaigns are considered to be the most sophisticated in the country among all political and non-political stakeholders. Hence, this provides a point of concern for the PM.
Even though Pakistani Twitter’s sentiment analysis presents an interesting picture in terms of the apparent popularity, in terms of positive sentiments, of various political and non-political stakeholders, this analysis should be treated as the “final word” on the topic for two reasons. 1) the sample size of analysis is limited and consists of 500-1000 tweets each for each stakeholder, and 2) the analysis excludes tweets in local and national languages, which might present a different picture altogether. However, the analysis should be treated as an example to explore how policymakers and politicians can use Machine Learning, and Natural Language Processing to gauge sentiments of social media users in the country.
-1: Very Negative Sentiment
1: Very Positive Sentiment
 The author holds a PhD in Politics from the University of Newcastle Australia. He has also previously received his Masters in Public Policy from the University of Erfurt in Germany.